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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

the person before whom the deposition may be taken.2-" It could supervise
the taking of t deposition, or order that it be taken before a master or
2some particular person.
It would be possible for a court to give undue emphasis to the protective orders, and in. doing so, it might unduly hamper the use of the
discovery process. But the protective orders will undoubtedly be used for
the purpose intended, which is the prevention of abuse of the discovery
rules.
JOHN ANSELIMI

CIVIL LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONALLY SHOOTING
A PERSON WHILE HUNTING
The use of firearms for hunting wildlife was a matter of necessity and
not of sport before the birth of our nation and continued to be so well
into the last century. During the Revolutionary War the Continental
riflemen displayed the skill which they had attained through hunting to
considerable advantage as militia and impressed upon the political thought
of our founding fathers the value of a citizenry armed to defend itself
against appression. This idea found powerful expression in the Second
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.'
Hunting has undergone a drastic change from the days when the
ri[e was the hunter's daily companion to the twice a year hunter of today.
.Statistics were not recorded in those early days but a review of the compiled
reports available today shows an alarming number of accidents. According
to the 1958 Uui(ornt Hunter Casulty Report published by the National
Rifle Association there is one reported casualty per 7,800 hunters 2 and in
cadi year since 1950, one casualty in every five or six was fatal. 3 In about
halt" (f' the reported cases the shooter fired intentionally and managed
to IiL :t human 'vctint; in the other half, the shooter did not intend to
fire. but the weapon was nevertheless discharged.,
In 1607 the history of cases concerned with the unintentional shooting
of a person began with the case of FI'eaver v. Ward.6 This case is supposed
27.

Nahrasoff v. U.S. Rubber Co.. 27 F. Supp. 953 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).

28.

Hirsch v. Glidden Co., 19 F. Supp. (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
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"\ well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right
of the people to keep and bear Arms. shall not b'. iffinged." .S. Const., Amend 11.
In 1955, according to a National Survey of Fishing and Hunting, close to 12
million persons in tie I.S. itunted on at least mie day. aud a tcual of over 169
uillion inan-dav's were spent in hunting.
O
01 the 1.51; caes analyzed 17% were fatal.
In 5j":, of the cases analhzed the weapon was discharged unintentionally.
.,.\!a:ri:,l from the 19i. Uniform Hunter Casulaty Report. published and copyright
bx h!e National Rifle Association. The report includes accident figures from 33
s.aativ :rnd 2 Candian provinces.
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to mark the departure from the "absolute liability" theory and the beginning of the "fault" concept of liability. But even as latc as 1891 the
well known case of Stanley v. Powell7 held the defendant not. liable either
in trespass or case for the accidental shooting of a guide employed by his
hunting party. The court, after a careful consideration of the English
cases, used the principles of ordinary negligence and did not attempt to
impose any stricter standard of care on the defendant. The lapse of time
had not convinced that court that "no man shall be excused of a trespass
except it may be judged utterly without his fault."' The standards of care
imposed by courts in more recent cases have, however. tended to become
increasingly strict.
The elements used by courts in formulating the standard of care to
be applied are illustrated in the following situations. The courts .1grc2
a higher degree of care is required in dealing with a dangerous instrumentality than in dealing with ordinary agencies which involve little or
no risk.9 It is well settled that a person who has in his possession or
tinder his control an instrument exceptionally dangerous in character, is
bound to take exceptional precautions to prevent injury being (lone to
others.' 0 Firearms used in hunting have been classified as dangerous
instrumentalities.'I
The degree of care required in the use or handling of firearms has
2
been variously described by the courts. In the case of Siefker v. Paysee,1
where the defendant turned in the opposite direction from those standing
nearby in order to close his gun and the deceased ran in front of the gun
in order to get a shot just as the gun accidentaly discharged. the court said:
Where persons are gunning together, and an accident occurs,
the negligence to render one liable, must be in its nature gross.
Fault must be shown.1 3
The requirement of a showing of gross negligence was repudiated by the
court in Norman v. Normand14 on the grounds that the report of the
Siefker case does not state the opinion of the court correctly. The court
in the latter case asserts that the negligence involved is a failure to use
such degree of care as is required of an ordinarily prudent person under
the existing circumstances.
The court in Welch v. Durand"'required extraordinary care to prevent
injury to others. In that case the defendant was aiming away from the
I Q.B. 86 (1891).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134 (1607).
38 Am. Jur., Negligence No. 85 (1941): 65 C.I.S.. Negligence No. 66 (1950).
Ibid.
Rudd v. Byrnes, 56 Cal. 636, 105 Pac. 957 (9091: Gibson v. Pavne, 76 Ore. 101.
158 Pac. 422 (1916).
115 La. 953, 40 So. 366 (1906).
Ibid. Headnote No. 2 by Breaux. Ch.J. of the Court.
65 So.2d 914 (La. App. 1953).
.16 Conn. 182 (1905).
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plaintiff but the bullet ricocheted and hit the plaintiff.

The court said:

Shooting at a mark is lawful, but not necessary, and may be dangerous, and the law requires extraordinary care to prevent injury to
others; and if the act is done where there are objects from which
the balls may glance and endanger others the act is wanton,
reckless, without due care, and grossly negligent."
Courts have often instructed that such care as is commensurate with
the dangerous nature of the firearm is required of the user. 17 This
instruction has been used in various circumstances; such as Rudd v. Byrnes",
where the plaintiff, who left his assigned hunting position, was mistaken
for a deer by the defendant who fired at an object he saw moving in the
underbrush. A slightly different wording was used in Morgan v. Cox"9
where the court said that the care should be proportionate to the probability of injury to others.
In Bahel v. Manning-- the defendant was found guilty of negligence
when the rifle he had been working on discharged, even after he had
worked the lever to extract the cartridges several times and believed the
gun to be empty when no further shells were ejected from the magazine.
The court said lie was not relieved from rosponsibility in snapping the
gun when it was pointed at the plaintiff even though, after reassembling
-it, he honestly believed the gun to be empty. The duty imposed in that
case was to exercise the highest or the utmost degree of care when handling
firearms in the presence of others so as to avoid the possibility of injury.
This standard of care is carried one step further in cases where the
defendant, a storekeeper, has allowed a customer to operate the action of
the firearm in the presence of other customers and injury was caused by an
The possible negligence of the
accidental discharge of the firearm.
customer did not insulate the defendant storekeeper who was negligent
in creating a dangerous situation. 2 '
Thus, it seems that most courts use the general rule of negligence,
applied in situations where dangerous instrumentalities are present, in
hunting accident cases. They require that exceptional precautions to
prevent injury to others be used when one has in his possession or control
a dangerous instrument such as a firearm. However, liability for negligence
in keeping or using a dangerous instrumentality, as distinguished from
the liability incurred in maintaining a nuisance excessively dangerous to
22
life, is not an absolute liability.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Ibid.
Hawksley v. Peace, 38 R.I. 5:14, 96 At. 856 (1916).
156 Cal. 636, 105 Pac. 957 (1909).
22 Mo. 373 (1856).
112 Mich. 24, 70 N.W. 327 (1897).
Naegele v. Dollen, 158 Neb. 373, 63 N.NV.2d 165 (1954); cf. Berry v. Harper, 111
S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
38 Am. Jur. Negligence No. 85 (1941).

NoTEs
Regardless of what standard of care is utilized, courts recognize that
the care or precautions which must be used by the defendant to avoid the
imputation of actionable fault are those adapted to the dangers peculiar
to the situation and the standard utilized must be adapted with these
23
dangers in view.
The normal tort concepts are applied in determining if the standard
of care has been violated. Ordinarily it is a question for the jury whether
a person has been negligent in the discharge of a firearm to the injury of
another. 24 In Webster v. Seavey25 where the plaintiff was shot when
mistaken for a deer it was held on appeal that the plaintiff's contributory
negligence was also a question for the jury since he was dressed in inconspicuous attire while hunting in the woods. The plaintiff was not allowed
to claim that the defendant had the last clear chance merely because he
knew the plaintiff did not wear a red cap as was customary among hunters
and shot without taking sufficient precautions to determine if his target
was actually a deer. The doctrine of last clear chance did not apply since
the plaintiff had the same knowledge which the defendant had.
In Rudd v. Byrnes,26 the defendant was declared negligent as a matter
of law, when he shot into underbrush at what he thought was a deer
without taking time to discover it was actually the plaintiff, another
member of the hunting party, who was moving around in violation
of the groups' agreement to remain stationary.
In Oliver v. Miles27 where it was impossible to say which one of two
bird hunters, both shooting over a road, actually shot the plaintiff, who
was traveling on the road, the court held them jointly liable for the
injury. In Summers v. Tice2s a similar result was reached with the
additional fact that in that case the plaintiff, a member of the hunting
party, was visible to both defendants before they fired.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied in a number of
cases involving accidental injury with a firearm while hunting although
the court does not refer to the doctrine by name.2 9 In Atchinson v.
Dullam8 o the court said:
Firearms are not usually discharged without the intervention of
some human agency. A presumption, therefore, almost conclusive
in its character, is raised, that when such weapons are discharged
while in the possession and control of another, the firing is caused
either by design, carelessness or inadvertence upon his part. s 1
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Gibson v. Payne, 79 Ore. 101, 154 Pac. 422 (1916).
Morgan v. Cox, 22 Mo. 373 (1856); accord, Annear v. Swartz, 46 Okla. 98, 148
Pac. 706 (1915).
83 N.H. 60, 138 At. 541 (1927).
156 Cal. 636, 105 Pac. 957 (1909).
44 Miss. 858, 110 So. 666 (1926).
33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
Annear v. Swartz, 46 Okla. 98, 148 Pac. 706 (1915); 56 Am. Jur., Weapons No. 26.
n.18.5 (Cum. Supp. 1958).
16 Ill. App. 42 (1884).
Ibid.
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It appears that many courts tend to lighten the plaintiff's burden of proof
in their instructions to the jury by means such as the establishment of
presumptions concerning the use of firearms and the shifting of the burden
of proof to the defendant by allowing the plaintiff to base his case on
evidence sufficient only to support a case under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
An increasingly severe attitude in the courts, concerning hunting
82
accidents, coupled with broader and more particularized criminal statutes,
concerned with negligence, have caused more and more hunting accidents
to be the subject of criminal rather than civil liability in recent years.33
Civil liability suits on the other hand have decreased because the record
of unsuccessful defendants in such cases has prompted a greater number
of out of court settlements. We may conclude that it is desirable that
strict liability should be imposed upon the hunter in his use of firearms
because, as Harris says in his article Liability Without Fault:
The best way to secure proper care and caution in present day
society 34is to throw the risk of damage upon the person who chooses
to act.

ROBERT C.

KELLY

ARE THERE INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CLOUDS?
Technical advances in weather control and particularly that phase
known as rain-making have posed many new and interesting problems for
the lawyer as well as for the scientist 1t The former is confronted with
such problems as whether or not individual rights have been affected
by the prevention of rain, excessive rain, accidents arising out of hazardous
highways, and destruction of crops as a result of man's interference with
natural rain fall. Unfortunately the attorney will find no reported cases
to help him with such problems.
One recent case, Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville,
Texas2 has, however, raised the unique question of a property owner's right
to the clouds over his land. The plaintiffs, ranchers residing in a west
Texas county, were granted a temporary injunction against owners and
32.
3.3.

34.
1.
2.

Variously termed (depending upon the jurisdiction) as negligent homicide, involuntary manslaughter, second degree manslaughter, or manslaughter arising from
an act of culpable negligence.
The treatment of these subjects by the American Law Reports Series indicate a
trend. Civil liability has not been the subject of an annotation since 1928 (53
A.L.R. 1205) but the 1929 annotation on criminal liability (63 A.L.R. 1232) has
benn superceded by a new annotation as late as 1952 (23 A.L.R.2d 1402). The
fact that both the anotations on criminal liability are later than the one on civil
liability indicate that the field of criminal liability for hunting accidents is growing
and that a greater number of cases worthy of note are found in that field.
Harris, Liability Without Fault, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 337, 868 (1932).
Weather Under Control, Fortune Magazine (Feb. 1948).
320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).

